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Religious Path Dependency? A Comparative Analysis of Patterns of Religion and Democracy and of Policies of Integration in Western Societies

Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of policy convergence in the area of integration policies from the angle of cultural path dependencies. It raises the question to what extent and how religion has been a factor in shaping integration policies in Western democracies, both with regard to the religious legacies of the host countries and the (predominantly Muslim) religion of immigrant groups. As a starting point, the paper addresses the observation of a growing complexity and cultural diversity of Western democracies in the face of new immigration waves and their consequences for the politics of immigration and multiculturalism from the 1990s to the present. It then raises the issue to what extent the current power configurations between politics and religion and more specifically the (democratic) state and churches/religious communities is shifting under the pressure of growing non-Christian minorities. For this, the paper configures the legacies of the confessional state (in Europe) and the regimes of pluralism and separation (in non-European democracies) by analyzing 19 Western democracies with a Christian background and their current policies of integration. The paper hypothesizes a considerable diversity, not just between the "settler countries" and the European countries. It attempts to show that cultural legacies such as Christian denominations, in combination with more political factors such as the role of political parties, play an important role in shaping a country's readiness to accommodate non-Christian immigrant groups, and that particular legacies tend to constrain efforts to recalibrate the religious power arrangements even in the most pluralist democracies.

Introduction

Religious pluralism or, where it has not existed until recently, religious pluralization has become a characteristic of all Western democracies in the new millennium.[1] This trend challenges the various national trajectories and arrangements of the nexus between religion and politics, church and state in the Western world. Against this backdrop, the paper addresses the issue of a policy convergence in the area of integration policies from the angle of cultural path dependencies. It raises the question to what extent and how religion has been a factor in shaping integration policies in Western democracies, both with regard to the religious legacies of the host countries and the (predominantly Muslim) religion of immigrant groups, and to what extent the current challenge of religious pluralism effects some convergence, superseding the historical legacies of religion in Western nation states.

As a starting point, the paper addresses the observation of a growing complexity and cultural diversity of Western democracies in the face of new immigration waves, the current patterns of church state relations, and the religious underpinnings of the politics of multiculturalism from the 1990s to the present.

The paper hypothesizes a considerable diversity, not just between the "settler countries" and the European countries. It attempts to show that cultural legacies such as Christian denominations, in combination with more political factors such as the role of political parties, play an important role in shaping a country's readiness to accommodate non-Christian immigrant groups, and that particular legacies tend to constrain efforts to recalibrate the religious power arrangements even in the most pluralist democracies. For this, the paper configures the legacies of the confessional state (in Europe), the regimes of pluralism and separation (in non-European democracies) and their current policies of integration, following Ruud Koopmans' approach of inclusive policies. The analysis includes 19 Western democracies with a Christian background, i.e. a sufficiently large n for a comparison of Western democracies (EU-15, minus Luxembourg and Malta, plus Norway and Switzerland, along with four non-European democracies, i.e. the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). In other words, the range of countries by and large reflects what is considered "the West" in the literature (Huntington 1996; Taylor 2007).

Processes of pluralization and globalization: new challenges to the political regulation of religion and the functioning of democracies

For a long time, the so-called "Western world" has been interpreted as undergoing a long-term process of secularization or decline of religion, the replacement of religious values by secular values. However, there is sufficient empirical evidence to demonstrate that religion, even in the Western world, is a power that does not want to vanish and that assumes a new significance in an ever more complex and pluralistic world (see Butler et al., 2011; Minkenberg/Willems 2003; Roy 2010). In Europe, more than anywhere else, many signs have pointed at a receding social relevance of organized religion since the 1960s, such as church attendance rates, the number of priests per population, the participation of the young, the knowledge of the faiths (see Bruce 2002; Norris/Inglehart 2004; Davie 2000). Against this drift, the pluralization and increasing heterogeneity of the religious map leads to a growing number and intensity of conflicts at the intersection of politics and religion. Several trends converge and lead to heightened pluralization in Western societies.

First, one of the most visible developments especially in Europe is the immigration and growth of non-Christian minorities, in particular Muslims. They are at the center of current controversies about multiculturalism, integration of ethnic and religious minorities, and transnational identities (see Addi et al. 2003; Casanova 2006; Kastoryano 2002; Roy 2013). Second, there are immigrant minorities which are Christian but of a rather different theological background, for example Eastern European Orthodoxy or Christianity as it evolved in the developing countries. Third, the proportion of religiously unaffiliated or atheists is growing in most Western societies, including the United States (see Putnam/Campbell 2010: 105). Finally, in Europe it is the European integration process itself, which triggers new and heated discussions, such as the issue of religious references in the preamble of the future constitution of the EU, or even more vividly the debate whether Turkey, for religious and cultural reasons, belongs to Europe and should be an EU member or not (see Robbers 2003; Minkenberg/Boomgaarden 2012). An overview of the current – and growing – religious complexity of Western societies is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Religious Pluralism in 19 Western Democracies, ca. 2000 (or Year Nearest to It), in Per Cent of Resident Population (Sources Indicated by Letter in Parenthesis)

	Catholics	Protestants		Orthodox	Jews	Muslims	Other/ None	Pluralism Index, ca. 1980*	Pluralism Index, ca. 2000*
		Anglicans	Other Protest..						
Australia	27.7 (a)	20.7 (a)	16.8 (a)	2.8 (a)	0.45 (a)	1.5 (a)	30.0	0.74	0.82
Austria	73.6 (b)	0.0 (b)	4.7 (b)	1.9 (b)	0.1 (c)	4.2 (c)	15.5	0.15	0.41
Belgium	80.9 (b)	0.1 (b)	1.6 (b)	0.5 (b)	0.35 (c)	3.8 (d)	12.8	0.05	0.21
Canada	41.8 (b)	2.6 (b)	22.6 (b)	4.7 (e)	1.2 (c)	2.0 (c)	25.1	0.66	0.70
Denmark	0.6 (b)	0.1 (b)	88.4 (b)	0.0 (b)	0.06 (c)	2.8 (d)	8.0	0.07	0.23
Finland	0.1 (b)	0.0 (b)	91.0 (b)	1.1 (b)	n.d	0.4 (d)	7.4	0.09	0.25
France	78.8 (c)	0.0 (c)	1.6 (c)	0.3 (c)	1.1 (c)	8.5 (c)	9.7	0.08	0.40
Germany	32.1 (c)	0.0 (c)	31.8 (c)	1.1 (c)	0.12 (c)	3.7 (c)	30.3	0.54	0.66
Great Britain	11.0 (c)	29.0 (c)	14.0 (c)	0.6 (c)	0.48 (c)	2.7 (d)	42.2	0.59	0.69
Ireland	77.0 (c)	9.1 (c)	7.4 (c)	0.0 (c)	0.8 (c)	0.2 (d)	5.5	0.09	0.15
Italy	97.2 (b)	0.0 (b)	1.5 (b)	0.2 (b)	0.05 (c)	1.0 (d)	0.1	0.03	0.30
Netherlands	34.5 (b)	0.1 (b)	30.0 (b)	0.0 (b)	0.19 (c)	5.7 (c)	29.9	0.62	0.72
New Zealand	12.8 (b)	21.4 (b)	37.3 (b)	0.2 (b)	n.d.	0.6 (f)	27.7	0.76	0.81
Norway	1.0 (b)	0.0 (b)	97.1 (b)	0.0 (b)	n.d	1.4 (c)	0.5	0.15	0.20
Portugal	90.8 (b)	0.0 (b)	4.2 (b)	0.0 (b)	0.02 (c)	0.3 (d)	1.3	n.d.	0.14
Spain	96.1 (b)	0.0 (b)	1.1 (b)	0.0 (b)	0.04 (c)	0.7 (d)	2.1	0.02	0.45
Sweden	2.0 (b)	0.0 (b)	95.2 (b)	1.3 (b)	0.2 (c)	1.1 (c)	0.2	0.29	0.23
Switzerland	41.8 (c)	0.2 (b)	35.3 (c)	1.8 (c)	0.2 (c)	4.3 (c)	16.4	0.55	0.61
USA	20.8 (b)	0.9 (b)	51.4 (b)	2.1 (b)	2.1 (c)	1.4 (c)	21.2	0.88	0.82

(a) Australian Census of 2001 in Cahill et.al. (2004: 46).

(b) Bowden (2005: 32, 94, 404). The Protestant group includes independent Christian groups which do not belong to an organized denomination. In some countries such as Australia, Great Britain, Canada, but also Norway and the Netherlands, the size of this group varies between 3 and 4 per cent. In the USA this groups counts ca. 28 per cent, more than 80% of which are Evangelical Christians, according to survey data (see Wald 2003: 161).

(c) Census data and other government statistics around 2000 in Fischer Weltalmanach (2004). Estimates by Maréchal und Dassetto (2003: Tables 1 and 2) for Muslims in various European countries diverge somewhat from Census data, in some countries even significantly (Muslims in France: 7.0%, in Norway 0.5%, in Austria 2.6%, in Switzerland 3.0%).

(d) Estimate by Maréchal and Dassetto (2003: Tables 1 and 2) for the late 1990es (Census data, corrected by expert opinion).

(e) For the year 2000 according to Noll (2002: 282f.)

(f) According to New Zealand census of 2001 (http://www.stats.govt.nz/people/default.htm, consulted on Feb. 7, 2006)

*) These values indicate the degree of religious fragmentation, measured by $1 - H$ (Value of the Herfindahl Index): the smaller the value, the higher the degree of pluralism. H is defined as the probability that two randomly drawn persons belong to the same religious denomination (vgl. Iannaccone 1991: 166). Data for ca. 1980 from Chaves and Cann (1992: 278), data for ca. 2000 from Alesina et al. (2003).

Note: Countries in which Islam constitutes the third or second largest religious communitiy are shaded in grey. Here, all Protestants are counted as one religious community.

The data in Table 1 underscore several trends. Most importantly, in 14 out of 19 Western democracies Islam is now the third or even second largest religious community (countries in

shaded cells). The countries where Islam is second are among those which are traditionally very homogenous in denominational terms, two Lutheran cases in Scandinavia (DK, N) and two Catholic cases (B, F) located in the West of Europe. In Spain, as in Austria and Italy, Muslims are on the verge of leaving Protestants behind. In the group of Protestant immigrant countries Australia, Canada and the United States, plus Finland, it is the Orthodox Church which takes third or second place.

Moreover, from around 1980 until around 2000, religious pluralism has increased in all Western democracies, except for Sweden and the United States. In traditional immigration countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand – along with the Netherlands – religious pluralism has increased from an already high level. In other countries like Austria, France, Italy and Spain – all Catholic – the jump started from a much lower level and has been particularly pronounced, thus challenging the dominant religion and its actor, the Catholic Church, as well as the established mechanisms in the relationship between the church and the state in a fundamental way. If it is true, as some argue (e.g., Castles 1993, 1998; Martin 1978; van Kersbergen 1995), that within Western democracies religious traditions assume a particular role in shaping politics and policies, hence constituting distinct "families of nations" (Castles), we should expect that in these nations the growth of religious pluralism and the increasing weight of Islam will provoke distinct responses by political and religious actors in the fields of immigration and multiculturalism.

All these developments push in the same direction: the established institutional and political arrangements to regulate the relationship between religion and politics in the framework of liberal democracies, long seen to have been solved, are challenged fundamentally and require new justifications. Even without 9/11, the multicultural facts of modern Western society raise new (and very old) questions about (a) the political regulation of religion and current church-state regimes and (b) about issues of citizenship, inclusion of immigrants and minority rights. These two issues shall be addressed in the following sections.

Patterns of Church-State Regimes in Comparison

The differentiation of church-state regimes, as done here, does not follow the conventional constitutional or legalistic typologies (see Robbers 2005) but ties in with the debates in political science involving political, institutional and financial criteria (see Champion 1993; Fox 2008;

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Madeley/Enyedi 2003; Monsma/Soper 2009). On the other hand, the criteria for classification should not be too inclusive and need to be set apart from policy and other effects or implications. For example, it is important, as Monsma and Soper (2009) argue, to separate the issue of religious freedom from the church-state relationship rather than using it as an indicator.

In a recent effort of classifying countries' patterns of relationship between religion and the state on a global scale, Jonathan Fox (2008: 48, 114; 2013) employs his GIR and SRAS scales (Government Involvement in Religion, Separation of Religion And State; see ibid, 4-6) and measures the official relationship between religion and state reflecting whether a state has an official religion and, if not, the nature of the government's relationship with various religions within the country's borders (p. 5). The scale ranges from 0 to 8, with the following types and scores (0) hostility, (1) nearly full separation, (2) moderate separation, (3) general support, (4) preferred treatment for some religions, (5) historical/cultural state religion, (6) state-controlled religion, (7) active state religion, and (8) a religious state (ibid., 111-139).

Here, evaluative criteria such as "hostility" are avoided[2] and a slightly modified scale based on Chaves and Cann (1992) is used. To their six criteria, two more are added, which refer to the central role of state support for religious education. Thus, countries will be categorized also whether or not the constitution or national legislation prescribes the inclusion of religious instruction in public school curricula, and the constitution or national legislation provides for state funding of religious schools (see Minkenberg 2003a: 122f.; idem 2003b). Overall, a nine point scale is obtained and applied to 19 Western democracies and a number of Central and Eastern democracies (EU member states), as shown in Table 2.

The distribution of countries in Table 2 clearly shows that there is no uniform European or democratic model of church-state regimes. The relationship between state and church varies not only across the continent but also within confessional groups, although a clustering of countries can be observed which shows more patterning than Stepan's confession-blind democratic patterns of religion-state relationship suggest (Stepan 2000: 42).

The Protestant group is neatly split into two opposites: at one end, the Lutheran-Protestant countries of Scandinavia (since 2000, without Sweden) show regimes of church establishment, at the opposite are the mixed Protestant Netherlands with their combination of separation and pillarization of politics and religion. They are accompanied by the non-European immigration countries Australia and New Zealand, Canada and the USA which early on switched from state

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[2] For a correction of this distorted view of the French approach of *laïcité*, see Roy (2013).

church to separationist regimes. Among the Protestant countries, only Great Britain stands out as having less than full establishment (despite the Anglican Church being a state church).

Table 2: Church-State Regimes in Liberal Democracies (ca. 2000)

Confessional Pattern	Separation			Partial establishment			Full establishment		
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Catholic			F (0) IRL (4)	I (4) SP (4) *SK (3)* *SLO (3)*	A (4) P (4) *H (4)* *PL (4)* *CZ (4)* *LT (4)*	B (4)			
Mixed Protestant		NL (1) CND (2)	*EW (2)*		CH (4) *LV (4)*	D (4)			
Protestant	USA(1)	AUS (2) NZ (4)				GB (5)		DK (7) FIN (7) N (7) SW (4)	
Orthodox						*BG (4)* *RO (4)*		GR (7)	

State-church separation ←---> State-church fusion
(Deregulation)   (Regulation)

Notes:

- Central- and East European countries are shown in italics. The coding of Bulgaria and Romania diverges from Fox's following John Anderson's analysis which demonstrates a quasi-established position of these churches (see Anderson 2009: 142f.).
- Numbers in parenthesis indicate values in Fox's taxonomy of the separation of religion and state.
- Portugal which is missing in Chaves and Cann's classification is coded 4 according to their criteria based on Canas (1996) and according to one point for each of the education criteria (7) and (8).
- The difference in coding of Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden between Minkenberg and Fox derives from different weighing of the role of the state (Ireland, New Zealand) and the disestablishment of the Lutheran church in Sweden after 2000.

Country abbreviations:

A:	Austria		H:	Hungary
AUS:	Australia		I:	Italy
B:	Belgium		IRL:	Ireland
BG:	Bulgaria		LT:	Lithuania
CH:	Switzerland		LV:	Latvia
CND:	Canada		N:	Norway
CZ:	Czech Republic		NZ:	New Zealand
D:	Germany		P:	Portugal
DK:	Denmark		PL:	Poland
EW:	Estonia		RO:	Romania
F:	France		SK:	Slovak Rep.
FIN:	Finland		SLO:	Slovenia
GB:	Great Britain		SP:	Spain
GR:	Greece		SW:	Sweden

Sources: Minkenberg (2003a: 123); Fox (2008: 48, 114, ch. 6).

The Catholic group also exhibits some variation, with France and Ireland occupying a separationist position, while the others show different degrees of partial establishment. However, no Catholic country qualifies as one with full establishment, not even Poland where the Catholic Church enjoys a significant number of privileges.

Interestingly, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, all of which gave themselves new constitutions after the end of state socialism, including a new arrangement of church-state relations, opted for a middle path. Except for Estonia, no country introduced a separationist regime and none at all a privileged position for their dominant church which would qualify as full establishment.[3]

Taken the patterns in Tables 1 and 2 together, we can now identify two major groups in which the debates on the political regulation of religion and religious pluralism take place. In the first group (Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany as well as some Scandinavian countries) we witness increasingly conflictual processes of realigning religion in the public sphere, for example with regard to the role of religious education (an increasingly controversial topic in Germany), the presence of headscarves and Christian symbols in the public, the fight for religious freedom for non-Christian churches (e.g., the debate in Great Britain regarding the recognition of Muslim communities and the torn position of the established Church of England, the controversies around Mosque building in Denmark, or the steps towards disestablishment of the state church in Sweden in 2000). But also in the "separationist group" (the US and France, and one might add Turkey as well), the governance of religion is experiencing increasing pressures from actors who interpret the neutrality and indifference of the state in religious matters as an adoption of particular political positions at the expense of religion. Secularism is seen not as a guarantee for state neutrality and a balance between all religious forces, but as a political program equivalent to a secularist state religion (see Kymlicka/Norman 2000; Modood 1997; Monsma/Soper 2009; Roy 2010; Wald 2003).

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[3] In Poland, strong conflicts about the proper role of the Church in the new democracy ensued which shape Polish politics until today (see Anderson 2003: 70-89; Fox 2008: 156f.).In Bulgaria and Romania during transformation, the Orthodox churches were weaker than in the Greek case of the 1970s and also compromised due to their closeness to the old state socialist regimes. However, unlike the Catholic Church in the other new democracies, the Orthodox Church in these two countries managed to secure themselves a rather privileged position, not only in the educational realm but also when it comes to official functions in the state apparatus (ceremonies etc.) (see Anderson 2003: 95, idem 2009: 142f.)

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The Politics of Multiculturalism and and Its Religious-Political Context

In order to specify the context of these debates and to identify a specifically religious input, the next step in this round of analysis looks at the integration policies of the 19 countries under consideration in relation to their political and religious underpinnings. An obvious problem for a large cross-country comparative study of integration policies lies in the limited availability of systematic and comparable data. So far, only a few projects have attempted to collect in a systematic manner data on these policies or aspects thereof on a large or even world-wide scale, which are useful for such comparisons. Among these are the data collection in the "Comparative Citizen Project" (Aleinikoff/Klusmeyer 2000, 2001, 2002; Weil 2001), the five-country study by Ruud Koopmans et al. (2005) which includes a variety of measures and indicators for the comparative analysis of the politics of citizenship and ethnic relations in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, has been expanded in a previous article by this author (Minkenberg 2008a: 65) and is in the process of being completed to include all of the Western countries (see appendix I).[4] Moreover, there exists the project of a multiculturalism index by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka which monitors the evolution of multiculturalism policies in 21 Western democracies at three points in time - 1980, 2000, 2010 – and measures multiculturalist policies for three types of minorities: immigrant groups, historic national minorities, and indigenous peoples.[5]

For the following analysis, the focus is on specifically religious immigrant minorities, especially Muslim communities and policies addressing their concerns. Therefore, the measures developed by Koopmans et al. (2005: 55-64) and their data are applied by considering cultural and religious minority rights outside of and in public institutions. The selection of criteria for group rights is guided by the reasoning, that in many countries Muslims constitute the largest non-Christian religious minority (see above Table 1) and that they are therefore not only more visible as a distinct cultural/religious group but that their distinctiveness as "cultural others" provides a particular challenge to Western societies' integration policies in particular, and democracy in general. Hence there is a particular focus on Islamic practices in assessing cultural

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[4] Ruud Koopmans and Ines Michalowski, Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants, in: www.wzb.eu/de/forschung/migration-und-diversitaet/migration-und-integration/projekte/citizenship-rights-for-immigrants; see also appendix I.

[5] See http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/index.html (accessed Aug. 5, 2013).

group rights although in theory they would apply to other groups as well. These rights belong to two of the five dimensions analyzed by Koopmans et al.: religious rights outside of public institutions (ritual slaughter, Islamic calls to prayer, provisions for Muslim burials) and cultural rights in public institutions (state recognition and funding of Islamic schools, Islamic religious classes in state schools, right of female teacher to wear the Islamic headscarf, programs in immigrant languages in public broadcasting, Islamic religious programs in public broadcasting; for details see appendix I). The other three dimensions (political representation rights, affirmative action and cultural requirements for naturalization) are not considered here because they touch upon other policy concerns such as political integration and formal citizenship requirements. Table 3 depicts these values for the 19 Western democracies. The classification of the countries rests on combined averages of the eight scores and of the two years 1990 and 2002 (see appendix I) in order to correspond to the time period leading up to the turn of the century and to the religious patterns shown in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 3: Confessional Make-up, Religiosity, State-Church Relations and Cultural Integration Policies, ca. 2000

	Recognition of Religious and Cultural Group Rights		
	Low	*Moderate*	*High*
Predominantly Protestant		*Denmark* *Finland* *Norway* *Sweden* **USA**	Great Britain Australia New Zealand
Mixed Protestant	Switzerland*	Germany*	Netherlands* **Canada**
Catholic	 *France* **Portugal**	Belgium* Austria* **Ireland** **Italy*** **Spain**	

Note: Countries in **bold** are those with **high religiosity**; countries in *italics* with *low religiosity*. Countries that are underlined fall into the category of strict church-state separation. An asterisk marks a strong position of a Christian Democratic party in the postwar era (see Minkenberg 2002 and appendix I).

The distributions in Table 3 show that in contrast to the relevance of church-state relations for immigration policies (see Minkenberg 2008b) and also somewhat to the argument by Fetzer and Soper (2005) about the significance of church-state legacies for the accommodation of Muslims, there is hardly any overall correlation between this particular institutional arrangement and the degree of cultural integration policies. One can infer that *per se,* a separationist regime does not lead to a low recognition of cultural group rights but on the basis of the data in this table, one can detect such an effect in combination with Catholicism. Among Protestant countries, there appears an effect in the opposite direction.

The overall picture suggests a denominational, or distinctly Catholic, effect on cultural integration policies. Predominantly Protestant countries exhibit moderate-to-high levels of cultural group rights recognitions whereas Catholic countries fall in the range of low-to-moderate levels. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the shifts towards cultural pluralism occurred mostly in Protestant countries – regardless of their "starting point" – whereas Catholic countries remained more static in his period (see appendix I, this paper). The Protestant group is neatly split into the religiously rather homogenous Scandinavian countries where recognition of group rights is only moderate, with Sweden more open (and more pluralist) than the rest, and the more pluralist immigration countries, plus Great Britain with its own tradition of religious pluralism under an Anglican hegemony.

Moreover, the Catholic camp is split as well: Catholic countries with a strong role of Christian Democracy exhibit a middle path in these policies, with Austria being more open for accommodation due to its pre-World War I recognition of Islam during the Habsburg reign (see Mourão-Permoser/Rosenberger 2009). Among mixed Protestant countries, strong Christian Democracy seems to have had no effect on the politics of inclusion. The denominational effect is strongly underlined: there is no Protestant country where group recognition is low, and no Catholic country where it is high.

Furthermore, the suggestion, found in some comparative public policy studies (see Castles 1998: 8f.; Baldwin-Edwards 1992) to identify a special Southern or Mediterranean group of countries with regard to their policies is not supported by the distribution in Table 3. In part, this misconception results from mixing up immigration rates and immigration policies (e.g. Faist 1998: 152). While Mediterranean countries share the common fate of being latecomers as receiving countries, their approach to integration is shared by other, non-Mediterranean countries as well (Austria, Belgium, Ireland). Our analysis suggests that what this group has in common is

their religiosity, not their geography. This is also true with regard to the growing proportion of Muslims in these countries. All four countries where Islam is the second religion (see above Table 1) employ a restrictive-to-moderate integration policy; moreover, they are Catholic countries. Secularization measured in church-going rates underscores this trend. All countries with high church attendance show low-to-moderate recognition of group rights. On the other hand, with the notable exception of France, countries with low church-going rates are more ready for such an integration policy.

Finally, it could be objected that the policy patterns in Table 3 do not reflect religious factors but the types of political system, or more narrowly types of democracy, in and through which they were generated. This argument is put forth most forcefully by Arend Lijphart in his work (1977, 2012) in which he seeks to demonstrate that a particulay type of democracy characterized by dispersion of power, many checks and balances, and veto points for political actors, called consensus democracy, is more accommodating to minority concerns and hence more inclusive than the traditional majority or Westminster type.

Lijphart summarizes these factors along two dimensions: the party-executive dimension which concerns mostly the relationship between political parties, the executive, and parliament, and the federalism-unitarism dimension which is rather independent from the former and constituted by factors such as a strong or weak judiciary, bicameralism vs. one parliamentary chamber, federalism vs. a unitary state and others. The classification here follows the reasoning, that countries which for the entire postwar period (1945-2010) have high values in the first dimension (more than +.33) and low values in the second (less than -.33), or vice versa, are categorized as "medium" types. Those with low values in either dimension or low values in one and medium values in the other, are grouped together as "majoritarian democracies" while the remainder (high values in either dimension or a combination of high and medium in either) are "consensus democracies" (see appendix II and Lijphart 2012: 305f.).

The distributions in Table 4 cast some doubts on Lijphart's argument as far as integration policies are concerned. It seems that there is no relationship at all between type of democracy and the level of acceptance of cultural group rights. While Lijphart demonstrated some relationship between consensus democracy and the responsiveness to minorities' and women's concerns, this does not extend into the realm of multicultural politics. Here the combination of party politics and confessional legacies, i.e. a "Catholic cultural effect" in the sense of F. Castles seems the most important factor.

Table 4: Democracy Type, Religion, and Cultural Integration Policies, ca. 2000

	Recognition of Religious and Cultural Group Rights		
	Low	*Moderate*	*High*
Majority Democracies	*France*		Great Britain
	Portugal	**Ireland**	New Zealand
Mixed Types		*Denmark Sweden* *Finland* *Norway* **Italy*** **Spain** **USA**	Australia Canada
Consensus Democracies	Switzerland*	Belgium* Austria* Germany*	Netherlands*

Note: Countries in **bold** are those with **high religiosity**; countries in *italics* with *low religiosity*. Countries that are underlined fall into the category of strict church-state separation. An asterisk marks a strong position of a Christian Democratic party in the postwar era (see Minkenberg 2002 and appendices I & II).

The general argument to be made here is that religious and cultural minorities (in particular Muslims) get higher recognition in those Protestant countries where there is a clear separation of church and state. Protestant countries with partial and full establishment are less accepting of such cultural group differences. Moroever, Christian Democrats are not particularly helpful for the integration of non-Christian minorities. Fetzer and Soper's conclusion about the non-accomodating effects of separationst church-state regimes hold only for France (and to some extent Ireland considering its borderline situation on the scale, see appendix I), but cannot be generalized. Also, as has been shown elsewhere (see Kastoryano 2002; Laurence 2008), one has to distinguish the type of Muslim group organizations when analyzing the effects of state-church relations: "European governments have evolved from a laissez-faire policy of 'outsourcing' state-Islam relations to Muslim diplomats (1974-1989) toward a proactive policy of 'incorporation' (1989-2004). The goal of incorporation is to co-opt the competing representatives of *both* 'official' and 'political' Islam." (Laurence 2008: 242). Finally, as the case of Sweden illustrates, an active and long-lasting multicultural, i.e. inclusive, policy approach can open the political

space for a significant rearrangement of state-church regimes. Even in countries which are stubbornly clinging to their time-honoured institutional arrangements, such as France on the one hand and Germany on the other, demographic change will likely increase rather than decrease pressures for change. These can be considered highest in traditionally homogenous Catholic countries where openness for multiculturalism is less developed than in Protestant ones.

In sum, it is neither the church-state arrangement nor the type of democracy which seems relevant for the level of inclusiveness in group rights recognition. Instead, we suspect a larger role of historical legacies in the combination of democratization and religious underpinnings, in particular the confessional factor. Therefore, a more historical analysis is added which takes a closer look at the development of democracy with regard to the role of religion in the process.

The Protestant-Catholic split and democratization

Clearly, the Protestant Reformation established a break in the hitherto established patterns of religion and the state and resulted in a confessional patterning of Europe and the world beyond with long-lasting consequences. John Madeley reformulates and complements Stein Rokkan's conceptual map of Europe from early modernity onwards (Rokkan 1970) and ties it to political developments up to 2000: "From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Europe knew three monoconfessional culture areas of major size located severally across the eastern, southern and northern margins of the Continent: the Orthodox, Catholic and Lutheran… In each the confessional state pattern was institutionalized for most if not all of this period so as to make membership of the political community coincident with submission to the locally dominant creed" (Madeley 2003: 27). Yet, despite the confessional monism within the territorial states, new ideas of political legitimation and organization appeared, especially in the Protestant countries where Lutheranism and Calvinism, in their fierce criticism of the Catholic Church, challenged established rules of authority and enhanced the autonomy of the individual as well as oppositional politics (see Maddox 1996: chaps. 4 and 5; and, more cautiously, Anderson 2009: 21-27). After these tectonic shifts in the realms of ideas and beliefs, it was the rise of nationalism and liberalism in the 19th century which undermined not only the geopolitical order of Europe with its multinational empires but also the confessional state, thereby paving the way for the breakthrough of the postulate of the secular and neutral state (see Fischer 2009: 15-54; Held

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1996: 39). With regard to the confessional divides, divergent paths of development and outcomes ensued (see Gauchet 1998: 15f.).

In the Protestant countries of the European North and Northwest, in which the church was also the national or state church – as in the Protestant countries outside Europe (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) where the Protestant churches underwent disestablishment in the course of the 19th century – a convergence between Protestantism and liberal ideas occurred in the context of a progressing secularization triggered by the Protestant emphasis on individualism, egalitarianism, and acceptance of diversity (see Bruce 2002: 4; 2003; also Maddox 1996; Kallscheuer 2006). In a more historical sense, the Reformation succeeded where the new faith found support among secular elites (Gorski 2011: 26). But within the world of Protestant Christianity, different paths of democratic development unfolded (see Berger/Davie/Fokas 2007: 36f.; also Martin 2005). Where Reformed Protestantism, in particular Calvinism, dominated, an early evolution of parliamentary rule and republicanism could be observed (see Anderson 2009: 21-27; also Gorski 2011: 44-55). With a delay, Lutheran Scandinavia followed the liberal, but not the republican, path, helped by "the internal variety within the state church and the laicist attitude of the devout" (Martin 1978: 68; see also Gustafsson 2003: 51f.). The exceptional case is Protestant Brandenburg-Prussia which during the 17th century developed into an absolutist state with illiberal features that, together with the Lutheran state church, prohibited democratization until the late 19th century. A major cause for this development can be seen in the protracted conflict between a Calvinist state elite, in particular the Hohenzollern rulers, and the Lutheran Estates, Church, and population all of whom were "disciplined" into submission to the state from above (see Gorski 2011: 55-71).

In Catholic societies during nation building, on the other hand, Protestantism and liberalism were seen as an attack on the Church and its power, and a conflictual, if not antagonistic relationship between Catholicism and liberalism prevailed. Nation building by mostly liberal elites put Catholicism on the defensive, and often, the question of loyalty was invoked: democracy emerged as a "nightmare" (Anderson 2009: 31). For example, in the French Third Republic as well as in the much less republican German Empire, these tensions culminated in the aggressive anti-clerical politics of French republicans and the separation law of 1905 and the persecution of Catholics under Bismarck in the so-called "Kulturkampf". During the French-German war of 1870/71, the liberal Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt proclaimed that after centuries of alliances between church and state and the resulting "holy ossification" of this

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institutional relationship, it was time for the strict separation of church and state: "… the problem of our time is the separation of state and church. It is the logical conclusion of tolerance." (Burckhardt 1934: 118; my translation, MM) According to Burckhardt, the reason for this radical demand was the Catholic Church's deeply ambivalent relationship to modernity. On the one hand, the church strove for an accommodation with the modern state, as it did with the feudal state, but on the other, it was unable to accept the modern democratic spirit (ibid. 117; see also Anderson 2003). This is not to deny liberal and pro-democratic tendencies among 19th century European Catholicism, such as the priest Robert de Lamennais in France, the Catholic support for the constitutional movement in Belgium in 1830, or the South German Bishop Ketteler who attacked absolutism and the police state in the middle of the century (see Uertz 2005: 17; also Maddox 1996: 196ff.). But only in Belgium did Catholic clergy and laity, by joining the liberals in their struggle for independence from the Netherlands, adopt liberal ideas, although they also managed to safeguard substantial privileges of the Catholic Church in their fight against liberal anti-clericalism in the late 19th century (see Kalyvas 1996: 187-192; Gould 1999: 25-44).[6]

The uneven development of democracy along confessional lines is accentuated by the particular paths taken in interwar Europe of the 20th century (see Bruce 2003, 2004). When comparing Protestant and Catholic countries in this period, Steve Bruce showed that with few exceptions like the Weimar Republic in Germany and the liberal regime in Belgium, it was the Protestant countries in which democracy survived the crises of the 1920s and 1930s and the rise of fascism and communism. In contrast, fascist movements and elites were particularly successful in Catholic countries, and Bruce attests the Catholic Church an anti-democratic politics in countries with a Catholic monopoly.[7] Either they cooperated openly with right-wing authoritarian regimes and groups, as in Italy, Spain or in France (especially after the establishment of the Vichy regime), or they took a more passive role, as in Germany. His explanation points less at the doctrinal than the structural aspects of Catholicism: "Catholicism, Orthodoxy and, to a lesser

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[6] This conflict seems even larger in countries with an established Orthodox Church, namely in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Here the late nation-building process fostered a particularly close and illiberal alliance between church and state (see Anderson 2009: chap. 5; also Roy 2010: 90-94) – a connection which was not lost to Huntington when he first discussed post-1989 democratization in Eastern Europe. He identified "the boundary of Western Christiandom of 1500" as the border separating the East European extension of Western culture where prospects for democracy were good, and that part of Eastern Europe, with predominantly Orthodox societies, where democracy was rather unlikely to take root (see Huntington 1991: 299f.).
[7] Strangely enough, current political science publications on (Catholic) religion, the nation-state and democracy tend to turn a blind eye to the nexus of (Catholic) church and (non-democratic) state in interwar Europe (see, for example Andeson 2009; Maddox 1996; Manuel/Reardon/Wilcox 2006; for a more elaborated account, see Whyte 1981: 76-82).

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extent, Lutheranism, with their insistence on the primacy of the institution of the church, are much more likely to see the state of the political embodiment of 'the people' as a community, rather than as the expression of the preferences of individuals" (Bruce 2003: 110; for an early assessment of structural affinities between the Catholic Church and fascism, see Warren 1941). Based on Bruce and other sources, Table 5 provides an overview of democratic and right-wing authoritarian regimes in the interwar period, with only those non-democracies listed which were not installed by German or Italian occupiers but emerged independently or before occupation, such as the Dollfuß regime in Austria or Marshall Pétain's regime in France. German puppet regimes like Tiso's in Slovakia are not included. With the exception of Belgium (and rudimentarily Czechoslovakia and Ireland), there was not a single Catholic country which remained democratic in the period. Moreover, in many Catholic countries which turned to the right, the church was either passive or supportive of the new regime, and the Catholic community experienced a split between pro- and anti-fascist forces, the latter ones being more prominent in countries where Catholics were in the minority, except for Belgium (see Whyte 1981: 79-81).

Table 5: The Protestant-Catholic Divide, Church-State Relationships, and Political Regimes in Interwar Europe (in parentheses: beginning year of non-demoratic regime – attitude of major church towards regime)

|	*Democracy*	*Right-wing Authoritarian Regime*
Catholic Countries	Belgium [Czechoslovakia]* [Ireland]**	Austria (1934 – supportive) France (1940 – supportive) Hungary (1920s – supportive) Italy (1922 – supportive) Poland (1938 – supportive) Portugal (1933 – initially supportive) Spain (1939 – supportive)
Protestant or Mixed Protestant Countries	Denmark (occupied by Germany 1940) Finland (occupied by Germany 1944) The Netherlands (occupied by Germ. 1940) Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom	Germany (1933 – passive) (Baltic States – "benign despotism" in the 1930s)

*) Czechoslovakia had a numerical majority of Catholics in the interwar period but mixed religious traditions, moreover in the first decade of its existence, the country experienced a cross-partisan wave of anti-Catholicism, led by the first president Tomas Masaryk.

**) Ireland underwent a transition to full independence from the UK after World War I which by 1937 resulted in a democratic Constitution with substantial privileges for the Catholic Church, thus adding a dose of illiberalism to the regime, congruent with a political culture in which "a dogmatic overemphasis on Catholic rules, duties, and obliations" persisted (Dillon 2002: 55).

Sources: Anderson (2009: 49-54); Bruce (2003: 97-111); Whyte (1981: 79-81) et al.

Overall, it was as much the horrors of the holocaust and the Second World War, i.e. secular politics and outside pressures, as doctrinal reform from within, which pushed the Vatican into accepting human rights, pluralism and democracy in the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s (see Casanova 1994: 71; Anderson 2009: 38-40). However, the reconciliation between the Church and democracy did not lead to a leveling of elementary political differences between Catholics and Protestants, both within countries, i.e. on an individual level, and between countries, i.e. on a cross-national level. An illustration of these differences, as they relate to democratic attitudes is provided by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart: their data, as shown in Figure 2, suggest that Protestant societies exhibit higher rates of approval of democratic ideals and performance, than Catholic or Orthodox ones (see Norris/Inglehart 2004: 146).

Figure 1: Protestant-Catholic Differences: Democratic Values

Sources: Pippa Norris und Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 146,
based on Values Surveys, European Values Survey 1995-2001, pooled sample

What Figure 1 makes clear is that the range of support for democratic values and ideas is larger in the Catholic world among Western democracies (in the box) than in the Protestant world (in the oval). To this may be added differences in social inclusion or "social citizenship" (Marshall

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1964), as institutionalized in the various types of welfare regimes in Protestant-Lutheran countries (Scandinavia), Reformed or other Protestant countries (the Anglo-American democracies), and Catholic-Continental Europe (see Esping-Andersen 1990; Manow 2002; van Kersbergen/Manow 2009). The differences in the politics of multiculturalism, as stated above, correspond to these differences and reflect primarily but not exclusively the confessional legacies as they shaped the processes of state and nation building, democratization and welfare state development. However, it may be that the current pressures on the political governance of religion, including the politics of multiculturalism, which stem from growing immigration and religious pluralization (plus European integration) and which affect all Western democracies in similar fashion push the politics of multiculturalism towards convergence and, over time, eradicate the religious and political legacies and national differences. Therefore, the last section of the analysis addresses the current development in a more dynamic perspective.

Current Political and Policy Trends: Towards Convergence?

As seen in Table 1, Western societies' jumps towards more religious pluralism are not only uneven but begin at very different starting points – but with the exception of Sweden and the United States, they all point in the same direction. The message these data tell can be highlighted by arranging countries according to the two dimensions: level of pluralism, and degree of pluralization. Table 6 shows that we are dealing with quite distinct groups of countries. One group exhibits low levels of pluralism and a low degree of pluralization (Irland, Portugal), here the monopoly of Catholicism by and large persists, and the pressure for changes is limited. The situation changes in the next group with low levels of pluralism but a medium degree of pluralization (Belgium along with the Scandinavian countries, except Sweden). These countries also start with a denominationally homogenous society, but in all of them but Finland, Islam now occupies the second place among the large religious communities. This scenario grows more acute in the third group, where a strong degree of pluralization occurs at an already elevated level of pluralism. Again, in these countries which are all predominantly Catholic (France and Italy, Austria and Spain), Islam takes second place. In contrast to these two groups, we find the non-European democracies with a combination of high level of pluralism but low degree of pluralization – which is a logical combination because their level of pluralism is so high that a strong pluralizing shift is mathematically as well as demographically impossible (see Table 1). This group is joined by one European case, Switzerland, which along with the three countries in

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the final group (Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands) belongs to the heartland of the Protestant Reformation which introduced early on comparatively high levels of pluralism, or more accurately, bi-confessionalism which later differentiated into a more pluralist religious landscape. These are the countries in Europe, where the dominant Protestant church never had a clear monopoly. We see also in Table 6 that with the exception of the non-European democracies, there is no clear correlation between the state-church regime and the degree of pluralism or pluralization. Compared to these cases and also Canada or New Zealand, Australia and the United States figure as the ideal types of a true religious pluralism because they do not organize their plural character around a politically consolidated dichotomy or bi-culturalism (see Bouma 2007).

Table 6: Religious Pluralism and Pluralization Trends in Western Democracies (1980-2000)

	Weak Pluralization (d< 0.10)	*Moderate Pluralization (0.10 - 0.20)*	*Strong Pluralization (d>0.20)*
Low level pluralism (<0.30)	*Ireland* Portugal (Sweden: d=negative)	**Belgium*** **Demark*** Finland **Norway***	
Moderate pluralism (0.30-0.50)			*France*** *Italy*** *Austria*** **Spain**
High level pluralism (>0.50)	Switzerland* *Australia* *Canada* *New Zealand* (USA: d=negative)	Germany Great Britain *Netherlands*	

Notes:
- The base of categorization is the pluralism value of 2000 (0: completely homogenous, 1.00: completely pluralistic);
- d = difference of pluralism value between 1980 and 2000 (trend).
- Countries in *italic* have *church-state separation* (see Minkenberg 2003a)
- In countries in **bold, Islam** is the second larges religious community (in Austria Italy and Spain: counted as equal to Protestantism)
- * indicates a strong radical right-wing or xenophobic party in the country's party system (at least 5% in every national election in the past 20 years).

Source: see Table 1 above.

Finally, in most the European cases the majority of which are Catholic countries, radical right-wing parties are strongly embedded in the nation's electorate, often pushing an anti-Islamic discourse and "rediscovering" the Christian roots of the country or Europe as a whole (see

Minkenberg 2008c; Mudde 2007). These parties add to a conflict potential which arises from the issue of religious and cultural pluralism and its clash with the national management of the relationship between religion and politics.

Taken together, the data demonstrate that today, most Western democracies are markedly more fragmented in religious terms than they have been a generation ago, and in light of the current demographic and migratory trends, it is safe to assume that religious pluralism will further increase in most of these countries. But does this lead towards more converence in the politics of multiculturalism?

The data on religious and cultural group rights, when considered separately at the three time points and reconfigure as trend lines, suggests very little convergence. Table 7 shows for all 19 democracries that there is some movement towards more inclusiveness but that the differences between countries by and large remain stable. The cases where some marked shifts occur include Portugal which started with no recognition of any of the group rights in 1990 and ends up in the medium range by 2008. Also Austria experiences a steady increase in inclusiveness, a reflection of its early recognition of Islam prior to World War I (see above and Mourão-Permoser/Rosenberger 2009). Another country with a continuous widening of the acceptance of multiculturalism is, perhaps surprisingly, Denmark. Here, as in Austria, politics in this issue area is affected by the existence of a strong radical right party, with at times formal (in the Austrian case) or informal government participation – yet the presence of these parties, less extreme than many others such as the French or Belgian counterparts (see Minkenberg 2008c) does not seem to have reversed the trend. This is different in Switzerland, where the lowest level of group right recognition of all cases considered corresponds with and partially results from the activities of the far right party, although a diversity of regulations exists at the cantonal, i.e. sub-national, level. But these little pockets of religious diversity and freedom are continually confronted by the national tide, as the successful referendum to ban the erection of minarets in 2007 shows (see Pfaff-Czarnecka 2009). Overall, the data in Figure 2 show that the increase in group right recognition which most countries experienced between 1990 and 2002 leveled off or was taken back in the period from 2002 until 2008. The politicization of religion and in particular of Islam in the wake of 9/11, along with the persistence of strong radical right parties and a xenophobic discourse (see Minkenberg 2013) must count as one of the decisive factors that the religious legacies which shape these policies, as outlined above, do not fade away but seem reinforced by these developments. This is true also for countries like the non-Euopean democracies where no

far right parties exist and high levels of religious pluralism have been a historical characteristic of these societies. In other words: path dependency outweighs electoral turns and political contingencies (see also Koopmans/Michalowski/Waibel 2012).

Figure 2
Religious and Cultural Group Rights in 19 Western Democracies,
1990 – 2008
(Averages; -1,0 = none,+ 1,0 = perfect)

Sources: **own research, Koopmans et al. (2005) and Koopmans/Michalowski (WZB 2012); for details, see appendix I.**

Conclusions

The paper has shown that a medium-range comparative analysis of patterns of religion and politics in Western democracies can reveal important insights into questions regarding the relevance of religion for particular policies and democracy in general.

First of all, regardless the multi-vocality of religious traditions, not all voices are equal and a historical mapping can show that democratization processes occur in distinct patterns which are related to cultural legacies. Catholic countries are late-comers in the world of democracies (as are Orthodox ones). Second, even with the universal acceptance of democracy among the major European churches, there is no uniform model of church-state relations in an institutional sense. The guarantee of basic religious and civil rights does not translate into any particular regime. Rather, there is a pluriverse of church-state regimes which are also respected by the European Union. Third, religious pluralization processes in most Western democracies, especially the visibility and growth of Islam puts pressures on the institutional arrangements. Catholic countries seem more resisting to opening up to these pressures than are Protestant ones, reinforced by the legacies of strong Christian Democracy. Fourth, in combination with the previous point, multicultural policies today are shaped by a distinct mix of church-state patterns, confessional legacies, and the role of political parties. Catholic countries resist the recogniction of cultural and religious group rights more than Protestant ones, and Christian Democracy, along with strong radical right parties, reinforces this within the Catholic world – yet not when it operates in a mixed environment such as Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland where the effects are ambiguouos.

The analysis and other data suggest that the inherited regulations of religion and politccs are not immutable, even in a fixed democratic setting. In countries with no separationist regime but high levels of pluralism and/or strong pluralization, the pressures to disentangle church and state will increase because of the democratic mechanisms at work (as Sweden has shown). Yet, despite strong pressures for change, these occur in an incremental way and are more likely to reinforce existing arrangements than replace them with new ones.

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Appendix I: A Scale of Religious and Cultural Group Rights in 19 Democracies

Cultural group rights as defined by Koopmans et al. (2005: 51-63):
Allowances for religious practices outside of public institutions
- ritual slaughtering according to Islamic rite,
- Islamic call to prayer,
- provision for Muslim burials)

Cultural rights and provisions in public institutions
- state recognition and funding of Islamic schools;
- Islamic religious classes in state schools;
- The right of female teachers to wear the Islamic headscarf;
- Programs in immigrant languages in public broadcasting;
- Islamic religious programs in public broadcasting

	Religious Rights (RR)			Cultural Rights (CR)			Average RR + CR			Average RR + CR		
	1990	2002	2008	1990	2002	2008	1990	2002	2008	90/02	02/08	90/02/08
A	0	0	0.33	0	0.40	0.40	0	0.20	0.36	0.10	0.28	0.19
AUS	0.50	0.50	0.66	0.20	0.40	0.40	0.35	0.45	0.53	0.40	0.49	0.44
B	0	-0.33	-0.33	-0.05	-0.4	-0.4	-0.025	-0.365	-0.365	-0.195	-0.365	-0.25
CH	-0,66	-0.66	-0.66	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.68	-0.68	-0.68	-0.68	-0.68	-0.68
CND	0	1	0.66	0	0.4	0.2	0	0.7	0.43	0.35	0.565	0.38
D	-0.33	0	0	-0.5	-0.1	-0.1	-0.415	-0.05	-0.05	-0.23	-0.05	-0.17
DK	0	0	0.33	-0.3	0.1	0.3	-0.15	0.05	0.315	-0.05	0.18	0.07
F	0	0.33	0.33	-0.8	-1	-0.9	-0.4	-0.335	-0.285	-0.37	-0.31	-0.34
FIN	0	0.33	0	-0.8	-0.2	-0.2	-0.4	0.065	-0.1	-0.17	-0.02	-0.145
GB	0.33	0.66	0.66	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.365	0.63	0.53	0.5	0.58	0.51
I	0	0	0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.8	-0.17	-0.17	-0.235	-0,17	-0.2	-0.19
IRE	0	0.33	0	-1	-0.6	-0.2	-0.5	-0.135	-0.1	-0.32	-0.12	-0.245
N	-0.66	0	0	-0.6	0	-0.2	-0.63	0	-0.1	-0.315	-0.05	-0.24
NL	0.66	0.33	0.33	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.63	0.465	0.465	0.55	0.465	0.52
NZ	1	1	-0.33	0	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.235	0.65	0.52	0.51
P	-1	0.66	0.33	-1	-0.2	-0.4	-1	0.23	-0.035	-0.385	0.1	-0.27
SP	-0.33	0.33	0.66	-0.4	0	-0.2	-0.365	0.17	0.23	-0.1	0.2	0.01
SW	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.4	0.4	0.4	-0.365	0.035	0.035	-0.165	0.035	-0.1
USA	0.66	1	0.66	-0.3	-0.4	-0.5	0.18	0.3	0.08	0.24	0.19	0.19

Sources: author's own research and Minkenberg (2008a: Table 3.7); Ruud Koopmans and Ines Michalowski,
Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants,in:
www.wzb.eu/de/forschung/migration-und-diversitaet/migration-und-integration/projekte/citizenship-rights-for-
immigrants (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2012f.).

*Summary Scores: A Scale of Cultural Integration – Religious and Cultural Group Rights in Western
Democracies (average for period 1990-2002 only)*

Low *-1.00 – -0.34*	*Medium* *-0.33 – +0.33*		*High* *+0.34 – +1.00*
CH	B	A	GB
F	D		NL
P	DK	SW	
	FIN		
	I	USA	AUS
	IRE		CND
	N		NZ
	SP		

Appendix II: Democracy Types after Lijphart (Data for Period 1945-2010)

		Values in Executives-Party Dimension		
		< -0.33	-0.33 – +0.33	> + 0.33
Values in Federalism- Unitarism Dimension	< -0.33	<u>Great Britain</u> <u>New Zealand</u>	<u>France</u> <u>Ireland</u> <u>Portugal</u>	Italy Denmark Norway Sweden Finland
	-0.33 – +0.33			*Netherlands*
	> +0.33	Australia Canada USA Spain	*Belgium*	*Austria* *Germany* *Switzerland*

Underlined countries classified as <u>majoritarian democracies</u>
Countries in italics classified as *consensus democracies*
Countries in regular type classified as mixed types

Source: Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Counries.* 2nd edition. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2012, pp. 305f.

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